How Japan Colonized the Mind: Taiwan's Managed Memory of Empire
Explaining Taiwan's Ambivalent Relationship with Japanese Colonial Rule
Introduction: A Tale of Two Colonialisms
Among those familiar with Taiwan, a notable contrast often draws attention: while public sentiment toward Japan in Taiwan is generally positive, in Korea it remains markedly negative. Given that both Taiwan and Korea experienced decades of Japanese colonial rule—often characterized by brutality—such a divergence in public attitudes may seem surprising.
Despite their shared histories of colonization, the differences in perception are stark. For instance, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Taiwan emerged as the largest donor to Japan among all countries and regions. Meanwhile, in south Korea, public opinion surveys have consistently ranked Japan as one of the least favored countries.
To understand this discrepancy, it is necessary to examine the historical circumstances under which Taiwan was colonized and to explore the nature of Japan’s colonial administration on the island. This analysis is not intended to justify or romanticize colonialism, but rather to trace the historical developments that have shaped contemporary attitudes. A comparative perspective, particularly in relation to Korea’s colonial experience, is essential in this context.
As this publication focuses primarily on China, with a special emphasis on Taiwan-related issues, Korea’s colonial history will not be explored in depth here. However, it remains an important topic, and further discussion with someone familiar with the Korean experience is anticipated in a future installment. It is also worth noting that while a segment of Taiwan society—including myself—retains a critical stance toward Japan, the prevailing positive sentiment among the broader population is not without historical basis. The objective of this article is to examine the roots of that sentiment and to explain how it continues to shape Taiwan’s relationship with Japan today.
Colonial Beginnings: How Taiwan and Korea Became Japanese Colonies
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing government under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (下関条約), known in China as the Treaty of Maguan (馬關條約). This marked the beginning of fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, lasting until 1945, when Japan was defeated by the Allied powers at the end of World War II.
Prior to Japanese colonization, a shared collective identity among the inhabitants of Taiwan was largely absent. The Han people along the western coastal plains tended to identify more closely with their ancestral clans and home regions in southern Fujian than with Taiwan itself. Indigenous peoples, meanwhile, maintained affiliations rooted in tribal identity rather than a broader sense of belonging to the island as a whole. Ironically, it was under Japanese rule that a more cohesive Taiwanese identity began to emerge—a process that unfolded gradually over several decades.
In contrast, a distinct Korean identity was already well-established by the time Japan began exerting influence over the Korean Peninsula. Historically, Koreans had often viewed the Japanese as culturally inferior. This perception was grounded in longstanding patterns of regional exchange: for much of East Asian history, intellectual and technological advancements typically traveled from China to Japan via Korea. Conversely, Japan’s historical relationship with Korea had been marked more by invasion attempts than meaningful contributions. Beginning in 1875, Japan initiated efforts to compel Korea into opening its ports through unequal treaties, further exacerbating Korean resentment and inflaming nationalist sentiment.
Korea’s geopolitical position between Japan and China heightened tensions further. As China had traditionally served as Korea’s suzerain, Japan's expanding ambitions led to direct conflict. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) was fought, in large part, over influence in Korea. Japan’s victory not only solidified its dominance over Korea but also resulted in the annexation of Taiwan as its first overseas colony. In this context, comparisons between Korea and Taiwan are especially apt, as both were drawn into Japan’s imperial project in close succession—almost as part of a single strategic arc
While Korea was ultimately annexed in its entirety by Imperial Japan, Taiwan—at the time of its cession in 1895—was only one part of the Qing Empire and occupied a peripheral position both geographically and politically. By contrast, Korea had long functioned as a unified polity with centralized cultural, political, and economic institutions. As a result, by the time Japan formally colonized Korea in 1910, Koreans had already spent several decades resisting Japanese encroachment. This resistance, which began in earnest around 1875 with Japan’s imposition of unequal treaties, unfolded on a national scale and engaged diverse segments of society. Major urban centers such as Seoul became focal points of cultural and political opposition, while anti-Japanese sentiment permeated every stratum of Korean society, from elites to commoners, the elderly to the young. Over time, this sustained and collective struggle fostered a strong sense of patriotism and national identity—one deeply intertwined with opposition to Japanese imperialism.
Localism and Fragmented Identity in Taiwan
Returning to Taiwan—although formal colonization by Japan did not begin until 1895, Japanese interest in the island predated that by at least two decades. In 1874, Japan launched a military expedition targeting parts of southern Taiwan, resulting in clashes with indigenous people. The conflict concluded with the Qing government paying reparations to Japan, after which Japanese forces withdrew. In response, the Qing court sought to strengthen its control over the island by investing in economic development and lifting restrictions on migration from the mainland in order to increase the population of the island.
Notably, this early episode of Japanese aggression did not generate widespread anti-Japanese sentiment among the local population.
Several factors help explain this muted response. First, the conflict itself was limited in scope and had little impact on the majority of Taiwan’s inhabitants. Unlike Korea, which by the late 19th century possessed a well-established sense of national identity rooted in a unified history and culture, Taiwan’s population was far more fragmented in both identity and allegiance. The island’s indigenous peoples remained largely affiliated with their respective tribal communities, while the Han people identified more strongly with lineage groups and places of origin on the Chinese mainland than with Taiwan itself. Among the Han population, further divisions existed between Hoklo migrants from Fujian (particularly those from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou) and Hakka migrants from Guangdong.
For instance, a Hakka resident in central Taiwan’s Miaoli would have had little reason to view a conflict between Japanese forces and indigenous communities in the south as personally threatening. The skirmish did not endanger the integrity of Chinese civilization, nor did it imperil the survival of the clans or communities throughout the majority of the island.
This stands in stark contrast to the situation in Korea, where Japanese encroachment was perceived as an existential threat to an entire civilization. Taiwan, by contrast, remained on the margins of the Qing Empire and Chinese cultural consciousness. Its distance from the political center in Beijing, combined with a highly localized and fragmented social structure, meant that few perceived foreign aggression in national or civilizational terms. Even during the Franco-Chinese War (1884–85), when northern Taiwan’s ports—such as Keelung (基隆) and Tamsui (淡水)—came under attack, the popular response was primarily economic rather than patriotic or nationalist. The dominant concerns were practical: disruptions to trade, rising import costs, and the impact on daily livelihoods.
In short, Taiwan’s peripheral status within the Qing Empire, both geographically and ideologically, along with its fragmented internal identities, limited the emergence of a collective sense of crisis or resistance. Allegiance to the Qing state or to an abstract notion of national identity remained far weaker than the tangible, immediate loyalties to clan, lineage, and locality.
Japan's Motives and the Early Challenges of Colonial Rule
Why, then, did Japan seek to acquire Taiwan, a territory that lay on the periphery of the Qing Empire and lacked a unified national identity?
One of the primary motivations was industrialization. As Japan entered its modernizing phase in the late 19th century, the need for both natural resources and labor became increasingly urgent. Taiwan was seen as a valuable asset in this regard. Japanese planners envisioned the island not only as a site for resource extraction but also as a supplier of agricultural and light industrial goods for Japan. This arrangement would allow Japan to reallocate domestic labor toward more advanced industries while exporting higher-value manufactured goods to Taiwan. In essence, Japan aimed to integrate Taiwan into its imperial economy by introducing capitalist production and modern infrastructure—but primarily for the benefit of the metropole, not the colony.
Following its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan formalized its acquisition of Taiwan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In response, several Qing loyalists—many of them Qing officials stationed on the island—declared the establishment of the Republic of Formosa (台灣民主國). This short-lived entity is sometimes cited by contemporary Taiwan independence advocates as an early precedent for statehood. However, its founders were not separatists in the modern sense; rather, they declared independence from Japan with the explicit goal of eventually restoring Qing rule.
Within months, the Republic of Formosa was suppressed by Japanese military force. Yet for the majority of Taiwan’s inhabitants, daily life remained largely unchanged. Under the Qing, governance had been administered by distant officials from Beijing who spoke Mandarin—a language unfamiliar to most local residents, who instead spoke Hokkien, Hakka, or indigenous languages. Under Japanese rule, the new authorities likewise spoke an unfamiliar language and originated from far beyond the island. For much of the population, the shift in sovereignty did not immediately alter the rhythms of daily life.
The Japanese colonial administration allowed those unwilling to live under Japanese rule to leave the island before May 8, 1897. In total, only 6,456 individuals—fewer than 0.25% of the population—chose to depart. These were primarily members of the upper class who possessed a strong sense of Chinese national identity. The colonial government calculated that permitting their departure would be more effective than risking potential political unrest from within.
As for the remaining 99.75%, the response was largely one of pragmatic acceptance. This should not be interpreted as enthusiasm for Japanese rule, but rather a recognition of political reality. Unlike Korea, Taiwan lacked a cadre of nationalist intellectuals capable of mobilizing organized resistance on ideological grounds. Although localized uprisings and acts of defiance did occur, they tended to be clan-based or driven by personal grievances rather than grounded in a broader national movement. As a result, the Japanese colonial authorities viewed such unrest primarily as matters of public order rather than political dissent.
Land, Resources, and Economic Control
Despite the relative absence of large-scale resistance in the early years of colonial rule, governing Taiwan proved to be a formidable challenge for the Japanese. The island was difficult to administer, and its fiscal infrastructure was underdeveloped. One of the immediate problems the Japanese encountered was the inefficiency of tax collection. A significant portion of land ownership went unreported, making it difficult to assess and levy taxes effectively. When the colonial administration initiated a systematic investigation in 1898, it discovered that 53.5% of Taiwan’s land was either unregistered or ambiguously held.
Under Qing rule, land cultivation in Taiwan had required official permits. Migrants from the mainland often brought dependents or hired laborers to help them clear and develop new land, leading to complex and informal ownership arrangements. In many cases, developers compensated workers with plots of land or granted them long-term leases, all without proper documentation. As a result, the Japanese administration required five years of detailed surveying and investigation to fully comprehend the island’s tangled system of land tenure.
To resolve this, the Japanese government initiated a policy of purchasing land from landlords and redistributing it to the cultivators, while still allowing landlords to retain significant portions of their estates. This approach succeeded in appeasing both the peasantry and the elite landowning class. Subsequently, the colonial administration co-opted these landlords—who held substantial influence in their communities—as intermediaries for land tax collection on behalf of the state.
Beginning in 1910, attention shifted from the lowlands to Taiwan’s mountainous interior. The Japanese launched a comprehensive survey of the island’s forests and highlands, but unlike in the previous phase, the state now claimed these lands outright as government property. These territories were primarily inhabited by indigenous groups, many of whom responded with armed resistance. From 1910 to 1915, Japan devoted 19.6 million yen to military campaigns aimed at suppressing these uprisings. While exact indigenous casualty figures are unknown, the loss of over 2,000 Japanese soldiers suggests that indigenous deaths were likely higher.
The rationale behind these campaigns was strategic and economic. The mountainous regions contained valuable resources—especially camphor, which was in high demand. The Japanese constructed roads to penetrate these remote areas, both to assert control and to facilitate the extraction of natural resources. Following the suppression of resistance, many indigenous individuals were incorporated into the colonial economy, often employed in resource exploitation under Japanese supervision. This is depicted quite well in the 2011 film titled Seediq Bale.
Breaking Western Capital and Building Japanese Control
The next major challenge for the Japanese colonial administration was establishing control over Taiwan’s trade. Prior to Japan’s arrival, the island’s economy was heavily dominated by Western capital—particularly British, American, German, and French interests. Foreign merchants controlled the export of key commodities such as sugar, tea, and camphor, while trade finance was managed through foreign institutions, most notably HSBC, which had a branch that operated out of nearby Xiamen.
To illustrate the extent of foreign influence: in 1894, British opium sales in Taiwan generated approximately 2.33 million taels of silver—far surpassing the 670,000 taels in tax revenue raised by Governor Liu Mingchuan’s (劉銘傳) Qing administration. Taiwan’s high-quality sugar, a globally competitive export, was also largely handled by Western firms.
In order to reorient Taiwan’s economy to serve Japanese strategic and commercial interests, the colonial government implemented a series of deliberate and systematic measures:
Tariff Increases: In 1899, Governor Kodama Gentarō (兒玉 源太郎) raised import tariffs to 15%, aiming to weaken the dominance of Western goods in the local market.
Opium Monopoly: Under the pretext of public health concerns, the Japanese administration banned British opium imports. Instead, opium production was brought under state control, with licensed distribution entrusted to local elites. One prominent beneficiary was the Gu (辜) family, whose collaboration with the Japanese would later position them as one of the most powerful and enduring political and economic families in Taiwan.
Challenging Western Capital: The Japanese government raised funds through domestic bond issuance and established local banks in Taiwan. These banks supplied capital to key industries and formed strategic alliances with influential Taiwanese landlords. In contrast, Western trading firms remained dependent on capital remitted from abroad, placing them at a competitive disadvantage..
Shipping Subsidies: To wrest control of maritime trade from Western firms, Japan founded a subsidized shipping company that offered rates significantly below those charged by British competitors. Although initially unprofitable, this strategy succeeded in redirecting trade flows through Japanese channels and establishing maritime dominance.
As a result of these coordinated efforts, Japan transformed the structure of Taiwan’s external trade. In 1897, Japanese firms managed just 14% of Taiwan’s exports. By 1930, that figure had risen to 90.5%, signaling the near-total integration of Taiwan into the Japanese imperial economic system.
Agricultural Exploitation and Infrastructure
In 1908, the Japanese colonial administration launched a ten-year public works initiative aimed at increasing agricultural productivity across Taiwan. The plan prioritized the construction of dams, canals, and irrigation systems, significantly enhancing the island’s capacity for large-scale cultivation. However, the benefits of this development were not evenly distributed across all crops.
Sugarcane, for example, became a focus of Japanese-controlled monopolies, which drove prices so low that many farmers were unable to sustain their livelihoods. As a result, numerous landowners were forced to sell their plots to Japanese buyers and continue working the land as laborers. In contrast, rice—less favored by Japanese consumers for its taste—remained relatively untouched by monopoly control, allowing farmers to retain greater profits. This led many to shift their cultivation efforts toward rice production.
To maintain control over agricultural output while maximizing profitability and minimizing unrest, the Japanese authorities implemented several strategic policies:
Water Pricing: Irrigation fees were calibrated to be just high enough to discourage farmers from switching crops too easily, thus maintaining stable outputs for key sectors like sugar.
Productivity Improvements: Expanded irrigation infrastructure enabled more intensive cultivation, boosting yields without significantly increasing costs.
Economic Control with Political Stability: The system was carefully designed to extract maximum economic value from the population while avoiding the kinds of disruptions that might spark rebellion.
The Japanese also aggressively promoted the use of chemical fertilizers to boost output. However, since Taiwan lacked domestic fertilizer production capacity, these inputs had to be imported from Japan. Even after the establishment of the Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation, local production met only 8% of the island’s demand. This created a structural dependency: Taiwanese farmers were locked into a cycle in which they paid taxes to the colonial administration, traded their agricultural products for Japanese fertilizer, and used that fertilizer to maintain the yields necessary to meet future tax obligations.
In effect, Japan engineered an economic system in which land, labor, infrastructure, pricing mechanisms, and trade networks were all integrated into a coherent structure optimized for long-term exploitation. Unlike the often haphazard and extractive nature of European colonial ventures, Japan’s economic colonization of Taiwan was notably systematic and sophisticated—designed not only to extract value but to do so in a sustainable and politically stable manner.
Control, Collaboration, and Cultural Assimilation
Why didn’t people in Taiwan resist more? Clearly, the people of Taiwan had much to be discontented about under Japanese rule. And where there are social antagonisms, there is invariably some form of resistance.
This brings us back to the central question: Why is Japan remembered far more positively in Taiwan than in Korea, despite the exploitative nature of its colonial administration?
One key difference lies in the structure of each society prior to colonization. Taiwan’s population largely comprised migrants from mainland China, and much of the island’s land was held by local landlords. Korea, by contrast, had a deeply entrenched aristocracy and royal landholding system. When Japan annexed Korea, it nationalized land held by the Korean aristocracy and royal family, subsequently concentrating land ownership in the hands of Japanese capitalists. This radical dispossession fueled resentment and intensified resistance, making Korea far more difficult to govern.
Learning from the Korean experience, the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan adopted a more conciliatory strategy. Rather than dismantling existing landholding relations, it co-opted the local landlord class. These landlords were allowed not only to retain their land but also to expand their economic influence—particularly by entering lucrative industries such as rice milling. In exchange, they were given privileged access to the Japanese market, which further enriched them and incentivized their collaboration. Over time, these landed elites became reliable junior partners in maintaining Japanese authority on the island.
Japanese authorities also appointed local landlords to official positions—such as councilmen or members of irrigation associations—thereby integrating them into the colonial administrative framework. In a society where people’s primary loyalties were to local clans and community leaders, securing the cooperation of these elites proved an effective means of dampening the potential for organized resistance.
That said, opposition to Japanese rule did not disappear entirely. Beyond the early uprisings led by Qing loyalists, new forms of resistance emerged in the 1920s following the expansion of secondary education for Taiwanese under Japanese administration. With increased access to education came greater exposure to modern political thought—including socialism, communism, and other anti-colonial ideologies. It was during this period that organizations such as the original Taiwan People’s Party (not to be confused with the contemporary political party of the same name) and the Communist Party of Taiwan were established. These groups found support among workers and peasants, many of whom bore the brunt of economic exploitation under the landlord-tenant system maintained by the Japanese.
In response to the rising influence of these left-leaning movements, the Japanese government implemented the Kominka Movement (皇民化運動) in the 1930s, aimed at deepening the assimilation of Taiwanese into the Japanese imperial order. The term kominka (literally “to transform into imperial subjects”) signified a campaign to erase Chinese cultural and national identity and replace it with a constructed sense of belonging to the Japanese nation.
This movement involved the active promotion of Japanese customs and language, the suppression of Chinese traditions, and strong social and legal encouragement for the Chinese people on Taiwan to adopt Japanese names. However, full social and political equality with Japanese citizens was never granted. The Kominka Movement was less about genuine integration and more about mobilizing Taiwan’s population in service of Japan’s wartime goals, particularly its campaign against China. Stripping the population of its Chinese identity became a strategic imperative.
During this period, many left-wing organizers were imprisoned, driven into exile, or forced to abandon their political work altogether. Japanese authorities effectively dismantled organized opposition, consolidating their control in preparation for war.
Conclusion: Postwar Erasure and Selective Memory
After World War II, Taiwan was returned to Chinese sovereignty. In theory, this shift should have created space for voices that had resisted Japanese colonial rule—particularly the left-wing organizers previously suppressed by the Japanese—to influence public memory and help foster anti-Japanese sentiment. In practice, however, this did not happen.
The Chinese Civil War resumed shortly after the Japanese surrender, and the Kuomintang (KMT), preoccupied with consolidating power, saw left-wing activists not as patriots but as political threats. As a result, those most ideologically and intellectually equipped to lead a critical reckoning with the legacy of Japanese colonialism were silenced. The KMT did not give them a platform, and many were once again arrested, exiled, or otherwise marginalized.
Some of these individuals participated in the 228 Incident, a tragedy that exposed deep-rooted tensions between Taiwan’s local population and the incoming KMT administration. While some of these intellectuals hoped to push for reform or autonomy, their involvement was ultimately overshadowed by the chaos of the incident, which devolved into violence in many places. The lumpen-proletariat unrest that followed gave the KMT the pretext to further repress these figures, branding them subversives or communist sympathizers. Their vision of a post-colonial Taiwan—one shaped by anti-imperialist, left-wing politics—was extinguished before it could take root.
Ironically, although the KMT had waged an eight-year war against Japan, it ended up suppressing precisely those voices in Taiwan that were most capable of turning anti-Japanese sentiment into a mainstream, popular force. At the same time, the KMT alienated Taiwan’s traditional landed elite, many of whom had prospered under Japanese rule and resented being displaced by the mainlander bureaucracy. These former collaborators or their descendants would, over time, become influential figures in shaping a counter-narrative to the KMT’s official version of history—one that cast Japanese colonial rule in a much more favorable light.
The result was a deep historical irony: the silencing of credible anti-Japanese voices left a vacuum that was eventually filled by pro-Japanese sentiment, especially among the postwar generation. These younger Taiwanese did not live through the harsh realities of colonial rule. What they did experience, however, was the KMT’s White Terror—a brutal era of political repression. Compared to the immediate and personal trauma of KMT rule, the Japanese occupation began to appear, in retrospect, more orderly, even benevolent.
This memory gap was reinforced by the tangible legacies of Japanese modernization. Many of the schools, roads, railways, and urban infrastructure built during the colonial period were still in use—and for some, these stood as symbols of progress rather than oppression. Meanwhile, the KMT’s narratives about Japanese atrocities—especially those committed on the Chinese mainland—felt geographically and emotionally distant to the majority of the people on Taiwan, most of whom were many generations removed from the Chinese mainland, unlike the mainlanders who arrived with the KMT in 1949.
In this context, historical memory became skewed. The brutal reality of Japanese colonization faded, while its material achievements remained visible. The voices best equipped to challenge this selective amnesia had been imprisoned, exiled, or erased—and in their absence, a revisionist nostalgia took hold, facilitated in part by the very class of collaborators who had once upheld the colonial order.
And this is how, in Taiwan, Japan came to be remembered more fondly than in Korea—even though both suffered under its imperial ambitions.
What a nice read! You truly expanded the dimensions of my shallow knowledge on the island. You clearly know what you're talking about. Would be naive to say it's just because you are taiwanese. The "motherfucker communists" are really something else. Thanks fellow traveler!